To arbitrate or litigate…that is the question

In the last decade or so, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) – mediation and arbitration – has come a long way.  In fact, a good argument can be made that the “A” in ADR could probably be dropped. Gavel

Briefly, mediation is the process of seeking a negotiated resolution/settlement to a dispute using a neutral third party to facilitate the negotiation.  There is no “decision maker” in a classic mediation.  Mediation is a process that can take place outside of litigation entirely, be engaged in the context of litigation in an attempt at pre-trial settlement, or can even take place in the context of an arbitration proceeding (Med-Arb or otherwise).

Arbitration, by contrast, is much closer to the adversarial and adjudicative process that we associate with the courts.  Sometimes arbitration is mandated by legislation or a non-negotiated contract between that parties (that one party didn’t really have any say in).  In those cases, a party might be stuck with arbitration whether it/he/she wants to be or not.  Other times, however, parties will jointly agree to forego the courts in favour of arbitration.  There are, as far as I’m concerned, only really four essential reasons that parties might opt for arbitration over litigation.

  1. Privacy – unlike court proceedings, which are public in nature, arbitration is a private process where no decisions are published and the parties can keep the evidence and outcome private.
  2. Process – parties to an arbitration normally have the opportunity to agree upon procedures and rules that are different from the Rules of Civil Procedure and thereby shape and tailor the process to suit the needs of the dispute.
  3. Speed/Cost – because an arbitration has an adjudicator hired by the parties and they are not caught in the public system “waiting their turn”, there is at least the theoretical possibility of getting a result faster than if the parties were simply to litigate (for example, in Toronto it is not uncommon to have to wait five or six months to get a 15 minute hearing for a simple procedural motion).
  4. Appeals – the parties to an arbitration can limit the rights to appeal the decision of the arbitrator.

Zafir Holdings Inc. v. Grassmere Construction Ltd., 2013 ONSC 1835 is a very recent case out of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that demonstrates how the objectives of arbitration aren’t always satisfied in the manner that the parties may have hoped when they agreed – perhaps with flowers and butterflies floating about – to arbitrate.

Zafir Holdings was the owner and Grassmere Construction was its general contractor in relation to a large industrial construction project.  A dispute arose between Grassmere Construction and one of its subcontractors regarding some of the earthworks and that dispute percolated its way up to become a dispute between the Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings.  Grassmere Construction’s subcontractor got judgment at a trial against Grassmere Construction and Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings agreed to arbitrate the issues between them.  The arbitrator found that Zafir Holdings owed Grassmere Construction a large portion of the amount that Grassmere Construction had to pay its subcontractor (as well as other amounts in relation to other issues).  Zafir Holdings sought, and was granted, the Court’s permission (leave) to appeal the arbitrator’s decision.

In the context of this short article, this case is notable insofar as it demonstrates how the primary objectives of arbitration were probably almost entirely obliterated in the end result. Consider:

  1. Privacy – the appeal, and the very fact that I was able to read the Court’s Decision and write about it here, means that if the parties had privacy as one of their objectives (whether unilateral or mutual), that benefit of arbitration has been lost.
  2. Process – there’s no way to tell whether the parties achieved any benefit here but, insofar as the ability to modify process usually has cost as its objective, I generally doubt it.
  3. Speed/Cost – the dispute arose in 2004 or 2005 and Grassmere Construction’s subcontractor obtained its judgment in June 2010.  By contrast, Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings didn’t get their decision in the arbitration until November, 2012 – two and a half years later!  Given that both Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings were likely involved in the litigation with the subcontractor (at least to some extent) and then had to adjudicate their dispute before the arbitrator (and pay the arbitrator’s fee which was likely substantial), it’s hard to imagine how there might have been significant cost-savings in the way that it all unfolded.
  4. Appeals – Zafir Holdings has been granted leave to appeal so there was no benefit here (in fact, the motion to seek leave to appeal added a layer of cost that wouldn’t have existed if the underlying arbitration decision had been a judgment of the court).

I’m not anti-arbitration – it certainly has the potential to be a useful alternative to litigation in certain types of cases.  However, cases such as Zafir Holdings Inc. v. Grassmere Construction Ltd. highlight the reason that I believe most parties contemplating putting a mandatory arbitration provision into an agreement, or those facing a decision whether to arbitrate rather than litigate in the face of a dispute, should very carefully and deliberately consider the potential benefits of arbitration.  In such circumstances, the question should be asked: “Is there a really compelling reason that I/we should take on the cost of an arbitrator (in addition to the cost of my/our lawyers) rather than proceed in a public forum and let my/our tax dollars pay for the judge?” More often than not, in my view, the answer will be “No”.

Mike Holmes weighs in on Title Insurance

Construction deficiency claims and title insurance being two of my primary areas of practice and both being near and dear to my heart, I read Mike Holmes’ article “A flood of misinformation: Title insurance is not a home warranty” in the National Post with some interest.

I don’t agree with everything that Holmes says in the article but he got the title right anyway.  Title insurance is a specialized insurance product and, as a very general statement, protects purchasers of real property from a long list of “title” or “ownership” related problems or “risks”.  It is not, and doesn’t pretend to be, a warranty of good design and/or construction.  The title of the article seems to suggest that Holmes agrees with this proposition. So far, so good.

Where Holmes really loses me, though, is when, in discussing hypothetical homeowners who discover major construction deficiencies, he writes, “Who’s at fault? Is it the homeowner who got the renovation? Is it the contractor that was hired? Is it the title insurance company, the building inspector or the government? As far as I’m concerned, it’s all of the above.”  How can the title insurer be at fault?

A policy of insurance (be it title insurance or some other kind of insurance coverage) covers what it covers and doesn’t cover what it doesn’t cover.  For Holmes to suggest, as he does, that the title insurer is at fault in the scenario he outlined is a bit like saying that when your house gets broken into and your auto insurer won’t pay for your stolen sofa, your auto insurer is partly at fault for your loss.

In any case – I thought the article was worth mentioning as Homes has brought some good media exposure to title insurance and cast at least a little bit of light on a common misunderstanding that I see all too often in my practice.

Ontario Court of Appeal finds that the decisions of Tarion’s inspectors are “judicial decisions”

The Ontario Court of Appeal  released  Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1352 v. Newport Beach Development Inc. earlier this week.  It’s an interesting case and may actually provide some useful jurisprudence in litigation involving defects and claims under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act (ONHWPA).

The facts are nicely summarized at the outset of the Decision as follows:

2] The respondent Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1352 (“Metro 1352”) manages a luxury condominium project in Etobicoke near the shore of Lake Ontario. It alleges that the project has two major construction defects. It claims that the sanitary sewer system was not built properly, causing toilets in the condominium units to overflow and the units themselves to flood with sewage. It also claims that a systemic failure of the exterior cladding over the project, called the exterior insulated finish system (“EIFS”), has caused water penetration in the condominium units.

[3] Metro 1352 sought compensation for these two defects under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.31 (the “Act”). The administrator of the Act, the respondent Tarion Warranty Corporation, denied compensation. Instead of appealing Tarion’s decisions to the Licence Appeal Tribunal, as it was entitled to do, Metro 1352 started this litigation. It has sued Newport, the vendor and declarant of the project; Canderel, a developer related to Newport; Spampinato, an officer of Canderel; Enersys Engineering Group Ltd. and Eric Pun, the engineers on the project; and Tarion. It has asserted causes of action for breach of statutory warranty, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The engineers have been noted in default. The other defendants have not delivered a statement of defence.

[4] On its Rule 21 motion Newport asked for various forms of relief, but principally for an order dismissing the action on the ground that the litigation is an abuse of process. Newport argued that Tarion’s decisions denying warranty coverage could only be reviewed by an appeal to the License Appeal Tribunal. Either the doctrine of issue estoppel or the rule against collateral attack prevented Metro 1352 from re-litigating its claim by a civil action. The motion judge, Corrick J., disagreed and dismissed the motion in its entirety.

[5] On its appeal Newport raises three issues, which I put in the form of questions:

(1) Did the motion judge err by failing to dismiss Metro 1352’s claims relating to defects in the sanitary sewer system and the EIFS, both against Newport and Tarion, as an abuse of process?

(2) Did the motion judge err by failing to dismiss the claim for breach of warranty for defects in the sanitary sewer system on the ground that they do not constitute a major structural defect under s. 13(1)(b) of the Act?

(3) Did the motion judge err by failing to dismiss the claim for defects in the EIFS on the ground that the claim was a new cause of action added by amendment to the statement of claim after the expiry of the limitation period?

One of Newport’s arguments in relation to the first question above was that the doctrine of “issue estoppel” should – Metro 1352 having already been provided determinations by Tarion that the defects were not compensable under the ONHWPA – prevent Metro 1352 from suing Newport in Court over those very same issues.

In analyzing Newport’s argument regarding issue estoppel, one of the things that the Court of Appeal had to consider was whether Tarion’s decisions were “judicial” decisions.  To my surprise and horror (OK…not horror, near horror), the Court of Appeal disagreed with the motion judge and ruled that the decisions of Tarion’s inspectors are “judicial” in nature.

I obviously don’t know whether any of the learned judges hearing this appeal have personally gone through the process of a Tarion inspection and of finding out what Tarion deems “warranted” or “not warranted” via its Warranty Assessment Report process. I also don’t know what evidence the learned judges had before them in terms of what the inspectors do (process, rules, policies) and what sort of education and training they have.  That said, in addition to representing clients involved in disputes with Tarion, I’ve been through several Tarion inspections myself  and  “judicial” is not a word that comes to mind when I consider how the Tarion inspectors handled my claims.  In my own experience, the Tarion inspectors that determined what was deemed warranted and what was deemed not warranted:

  • Communicated regularly with both me and the builder in the absence of the other before (and after) issuing the Warranty Assessment Report, making the process far from open and transparent. Both sides can feed the inspector information without the other side necessarily knowing about it and there is, therefore, no way to know what information is being provided and what sort of verification is being done.
  • Did not hold anything that could reasonably be considered a “hearing”.
  • Don’t allow third/non-parties to be present during the inspection. If it is “judicial” or adjudicative in nature, why wouldn’t an owner or builder be permitted to have a lawyer or an expert, for example, present?
  • Adhered rigidly and inflexibly to Tarion’s “Construction Performance Guidelines” which are a useful but, in my view, imperfect and incomplete set of “guidelines”.  There is not much “judicial” analysis involved in robotically applying “guidelines” as though they are infallible and carry no exceptions.
  • Did not have any legal training.
  • Ignored large amounts of information provided to them (such as manufacturer’s installation instructions that had not been followed by our builder).  None of this showed up anywhere in our Warranty Assessment Reports and when I asked about it at the inspection, I was told by one of the inspectors that he “hadn’t looked at it”.
  • Didn’t bring a ladder or binoculars or have any way of “inspecting” second story exterior deficiencies for which they had ample and complete notice were to be assessed.  If the inspectors are tasked with inspecting deficiencies and then making a “judicial” determination regarding same, how can they possibly do so if they show up and don’t have any manner of even looking at the alleged deficiency?
  • Didn’t take note of most things either party said during the inspection. While I don’t think a detailed transcript should be required, when few notes are taken one is left to wonder how much information is actually making it onto “the record”.

At the end of the day, I think that the outcome (and most of the analysis) in this Decision is correct so it may be that not much turns, in practice, on this aspect of the Decision.  It just strikes me – as I expect it might strike many who have had the experience of actually going through the Tarion conciliation inspection and assessment process – that to call Tarion’s internal decision making process “judicial” is inaccurate and diminishes truly judicial decision making.  Just because an animal has a bill, webbed feet, and lays eggs, doesn’t necessarily mean it is a platypus.

An “Interest”ing Decision – A contractual interest claim gone wrong

What an awful Blog post title. My apologies.

The Decision of Madame Justice Pierce in 1188710 Ontario Ltd. v. Gartner, 2012 ONSC 6110 (CanLII) is a good reminder of how judges trying to do perceived justice between parties sometimes finds the law bent (or worse – disregarded) in favour of perceived justice.

The facts of the case aren’t particularly remarkable – contractor does work, owner takes issue with various things and doesn’t pay all invoices, contractor liens, lawsuit follows.  Same old story.  Sometimes the contractor comes out on top and sometimes it is the owner that prevails.  In this case, Pierce J. interpreted the agreement between the contractor and the owners and the evidence that was presented at trial almost entirely in favour the contractor.

The two aspects of the Decision that prompted me to write this short post are:

  1. Pierce J. found a contractual entitlement to interest and awarded the contractor interest at 5.5% per annum; and
  2. Pierce J. declared that the contractor has a lien against the Defendants’ property for an amount that includes the interest that she found to be owing.

Contractual Interest

If Pierce J. had just addressed the issue of interest as one of damages (the contractor’s losses based on interest the contractor had to pay on its line of credit or to its own suppliers) rather than as interest and if the contractor had presented better evidence on this point, I don’t think there would be an issue.  However, because Pierce J. expressly found that there was no agreement as to interest (see paras 37 & 40), I think she should have been foreclosed from awarding contractual interest.  Nonetheless, she (wrongly in my view) reasoned that a contractual obligation to pay invoices within a specified time implied an agreement to pay interest if payment was not made within that time (see para 44).  If Pierce J. were right on this, it would effectively mean that every contract that obliges a party to pay contains an implied agreement to pay interest if payment isn’t made.  I don’t think that this is the law and I don’t think this accords with longstanding jurisprudence that parties should, as a general rule, be held to their bargains – if the contractor had wanted to negotiate a contractual entitlement and rate of interest, he could easily have done so.

The next part is that there seemed to be some very loose (it seems to have been given just in oral testimony at trial) evidence that the contractor had suffered some sort of losses based on having to dip into his line of credit and charges from his own suppliers as a result of the owner not paying all of his invoices (see para 100, for example).  It was this evidence that Pierce J. used to determine the rate of “interest” that the contractor should be entitled to (5 browse around here.5% was the contractor’s rate on his line of credit…so Pierce J. somehow made that the contractual rate of interest “agreed to” between the contractor and the owner).  I wouldn’t be so offended by this had Pierce J. just characterised the amount payable as damages rather than interest.  However, even then, the problem would be that she found as a fact that, “Unfortunately, there is no evidence about how much [the contractor] had to draw on his line of credit for this project, or how much interest he paid.”  In effect, she awarded damages in the absence of any evidence of the proven quantum of those damages.

I think that there should have been found to be no agreement as to interest and so only pre-judgment interest payable to the contractor pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.  Further, should Pierce J. have been inclined to find a breach of an obligation to pay on the part of the owner, she could have still found damages to have resulted from the breach but she should have then found (on the evidence described by the Decision) that the contractor did not adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim and then awarded no damages on the basis that quantum had not been proven.  Instead we are left with, in my view, a bad Decision (on this point) that could come back to haunt other litigants arguing this sort of contractual interest dispute.

Lien for Interest

On the second point, section 14(2) of the Construction Lien Act expressly says that, “No person is entitled to a lien for any interest on the amount owed to the person in respect of the services or materials that have been supplied by the person, but nothing in this subsection affects any right that the person may otherwise have to recover that interest.”  As such, Pierce J. erred in law by including the interest she awarded the contractor in the declared amount of the lien she declared the contractor to have over the owner’s lands.  The interest should have been included in the money judgment but should not have been included in the value of the lien.

Elliot Lake mall collapse litigation is underway

The Globe and Mail reports today that lawsuits are underway. Click here to read the article.  There probably won’t be much of interest to report for quite some time (as the case moves slowly through discovery and pre-trial procedural motions) but I will keep an eye on the case and post anything of interest.

Notice (Still) Means Notice: Ontario Court of Appeal upholds dismissal of contractor’s claim for failure to provide notice of the claim to the owner as required by the contract

Hot off the presses is Technicore Underground Inc. v. Toronto (City) in which the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld the lower Court’s decision to dismiss a contractor’s (Clearway) claim against the owner (City of Toronto) as a result of Clearway’s failure to give the City of Toronto notice of its claim within 30 days “…after completion of the work affected by the situation” as was required by the contract between the parties.

Clearway gave the City of Toronto notice for part of its claim within the 30 day period required by the contract but didn’t give notice of another, much larger, component of its desired claim until more than three years later and within the context of the litigation that was commenced following the initial notice was given.  The City of Toronto brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the portion of Clearway’s claim for which notice had not been given within the required 30 days.  The motions judge granted partial summary judgment and dismissed the bulk of Clearway’s claim (more than $2.1M) for failure to give notice as required by the contract.

On appeal, Clearway argued that:

  • the notice provision was merely procedural and required “failing which” (or my preferred, “or else…”) language to have the drastic effect of permitting the dismissal of the claim;
  • in the absence of prejudice to the City of Toronto arising from the failure to give notice, the failure to give notice should not be fatal;
  • the City of Toronto’s own failure to comply with a different provision of the contract should disentitle it from relying on the notice provision;
  • portions of the claims for which no/late notice was given were really just extensions of the parts of the claim for which notice was given; and
  • the City of Toronto waived its right to rely on the notice provision.

The Court of Appeal rejected all of Clearway’s arguments and dismissed the appeal.  In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Corpex (1977) Inc. v. The Queen in right of Canada (and the BC and Ontario Decisions in Doyle Construction Co. v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. and Bemar Construction (Ontario) Inc. v. Mississauga (City of)).  I’m not going to repeat or summarize the Court’s reasoning but, if you are so inclined, it is worth the 15-20 minute read.

For contractors and owners, the primary take-away from this Decision is the reminder of how critical it is to know what is in your contract, understand what is required in various situations, and if the contract requires that you do something – to do it!  The consequences of failing to follow the requirements of your contract are not always this dramatic (and sometimes there will be some fact or event that can relieve you from a failure to comply) but why take the chance?

For fellow lawyers, aside from the substantive utility and importance of this Decision, I think we can all take note of the increasingly obvious reality that one of the most effective, appropriate, and useful applications of the new Rule 20 regime for summary judgment motions is the early and inexpensive resolution of claims that can be determined on the basis of the interpretation of contractual provisions (and their application to uncontroversial facts).

Can the Ontario Repair and Storage Liens Act be used to secure unpaid debts in the construction context?

The short answer: Possibly sometimes, maybe.

I recently had a case where this was one of the primary issues.  My client was supplying coated structural steel for a large steel building.  Raw (uncoated) steel was purchased in the US, shipped to Ontario to be coated by a third party subcontractor and, once coated, the steel was then shipped to the project site (located in another Province).  A dispute arose between my client and the subcontractor coating the steel regarding price and claimed extras and the subcontractor asserted a construction lien in relation to the steel already delivered to the project site and a possessory lien under section 3 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA) over the steel still in the subcontractor’s possession.

In my view, the subcontractor’s invocation of the RSLA to assert a possessory lien over the steel in its possession (effectively holding my client’s steel hostage until my client posted security with the Court to secure its release) was a twisted and tortured application of legislation ostensibly designed to provide security to an unpaid “repairer” who had fixed a sailboat or a car or a wristwatch or some other widget (you get the idea).  However, the definitions of “article”, “repair”, and “repairer” under the RSLA are so expansive that, at least at first blush, it can be argued to apply to individual items (i.e. steel) in the manufacturing process.  The relevant definitions are:

“article” means an item of tangible personal property other than a fixture;

“repair” means an expenditure of money on, or the application of labour, skill or materials to, an article for the purpose of altering, improving or restoring its properties or maintaining its condition and includes,

(a) the transportation of the article for purpose of making a repair,

(b) the towing of an article,

(c) the salvage of an article;

“repairer” means a person who makes a repair on the understanding that the person will be paid for the repair;

As you can see, these definitions are extremely broad and almost any item is capable of being an “article” and almost anything that someone can do to that item (with the expectation of compensation or profit) can be considered a “repair”.  The real pinch, though, is just how powerful (and some might say draconian) the RSLA is – without getting into the fine legal details, it gives the party asserting the possessory lien the ability to hold the item(s) hostage, name its price, and barring early and expensive court challenge or the posting of security, sell the item(s) without any trial or court Order.  No other statute in Ontario, that I’m aware of, gives a self-declared creditor that kind of power without any kind of pre-execution/pre-sale judicial process.

Realistically, this apparent potential for misapplication of the RSLA in the manufacturing/construction process is not likely to have a frequent or significant effect on the general construction industry – the problem my client ran into with the RSLA can only practically arise when Party A delivers its own material to party B for Party B to “alter” or “improve” that material and then a dispute arises between Party A and Party B while Party B still has Party A’s “articles” in its possession.  This is where Party B can hold Party A’s own material hostage to extract payment (or the posting of security) for Party A to secure its release.  In the more common scenario where Party A is paying Party B money to build or “alter” or “improve” Party B’s own material, the RSLA doesn’t really work because Party B would simply be refusing to release its own material to Party A – doesn’t pack quite the same punch.

If your business (or that of one of your clients if you are a lawyer or professional advisor) involves delivering materials to someone else for them to be altered or improved, beware the RSLA.  Where this is the case, the RSLA permits the parties to contract out of the repairer’s right to a possessory lien (the opening words of section 3) and doing so should be given some very serious consideration.

Legistative Amendment Required – Posting security to clear a “common element” related lien from an individual condominium unit should be easier

I recently learned that, when it comes to securing the release of a construction lien for work done to the common elements from an individual condominium unit by paying security into Court, the Ontario Construction Lien Act and the Ontario Condominium Act don’t play particularly well together.  The problem is that neither piece of legislation has a clear and express mechanism for the owner of a condominium unit to pay money into Court as security to clear title to the unit where a construction lien attaches to the unit but arises from work done to the common elements of the condominium corporation.

Where the work is done to an individual unit (i.e. a kitchen renovation) and the construction lien is registered against that unit, section 44(1) of the Construction Lien Act provides a simple mechanism for the owner to clear title (to sell or refinance, for example).  However, the Construction Lien Act provides no such simple mechanism where the work was done to the common elements (i.e. a roof replacement or elevator repair) and the contractor and its subcontractors have registered the full value of their alleged liens against title to all of the units comprising the condominium corporation.

I had occasion to argue this issue in Court recently and cobbled together an argument using:

  • sections 11, 13, 14, 18(2), and 23(6) of the Condominium Act;
  • sections 44(2) and 44(4) of the Construction Lien Act; and
  • the Decision of Master Polika in Associated Mechanical Trades Inc. v. Kurzbauer, [2008] O.J. No. 4688 (S.C.J.)

to argue that the proper amount to be posted as security to clear title to individual units should be the unit’s proportionate share of the lien (determined by the unit’s interest in the common elements as established by the declaration) and that same proportion of the unit owner’s potential exposure to the security costs contemplated by section 44(1) of the Construction Lien Act.  The lawyer opposing my motion had a couple of different theories of what security my client ought to post in relation to each unit.  At the end of the day, Mr. Justice Reilly agreed with my argument.  However, if the legislation – either the Condominium Act or the Construction Lien Act – were amended to provide a clear mechanism to address this problem, costly Court hearings such as the one I recently argued could be avoided and it could be as simple to clear title by positing security for condominium units as it is under section 44(1) for non-condominium properties.

On a closing note, the B.C. legislature seems to have recognized this need and provided a solution.  The B.C. equivalent of Ontario’s Condominium Act is the Strata Property Act and its equivalent of Ontario’s Construction Lien Act is the Builders Lien Act.  Under the Strata Property Act, Division 5 of Part 5 (sections 86-90) plus section 166 provides what is pretty much a complete mechanism for an owner of an individual strata lot to remove a builders lien arising from work to common property upon payment into Court of the strata lot owner’s proportionate share of the lien.  I can’t see any good reason why the Ontario legislature shouldn’t follow suit to enact similar provisions in Ontario since this seems to be the combined, though not clearly articulated, intent of sections 11, 13, , 14, 18(2), and 23(6) of the Condominium Act and sections 44(2) and 44(4) of the Construction Lien Act.

Vidmate | Download Vidmate APK App For Free!

Vidmate: There are many video clip downloading and install software out there for your PC and Mac where you are able to download videos from several prominent video clip internet sites like Youtube, Dailymotion etc. However they are only offered for your computer systems. Vidmate Yet what about the mobile customer? Now the concern occurs is that how can they dowload videos from Youtube or any other websites directly to their phone. So below I am mosting likely to mention you about some application that enables you to download videos directly from YouTube or other sites to your phone.
Vidmate is an internet browser based application that allows you to download videos or audios straight from any media (Video clip or Audio) web sites like YouTube, SoundCloud etc to your phone in high quality. Vidmate Android Vidmate is presently the most effective application offered in market to download videos in any style or resolution you want. The application is totally free of cost which you can easily download from market or from their official website. In addition the size of Vidmate is really reduced i.e just 3-5 megabytes, this means it will certainly not take much of your app/device storage. twitter It has an easy UI that any person could comprehend at first sight.

The best ways to use vidmate?

Vidmate is very simple to use and also has a really straightforward UI. Using vid mate resembles consuming pizza:p.
So here is how you can use vidmate, for the example I am using YouTube as my source.

Step 1: Dowload Vidmate.

Step 2: Mount Vid companion.

Step 3: Open up the Video companion Application on your phone, you will certainly see an internet browser like user interface like Opera Mini.

Step 4: In the address bar kind the video/audio link you intend to download. For example: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=40H9mpkkaz0.

Why video friend is better compared to other youtube downloader?

Vidmate is surely far better compared to any other youtube downloader offered out there. It offers an extremely straightforward UI that any person could recognize and also utilize. Vid friend apk supplies a lot of functions to its users.Users could download their favorite Videos and films absolutely free of cost from different system such as YouTube, Facebook, Soundcloud as well as many more.

“I said ¾ of an inch. Look – it’s right there in the contract”

D’Urzo Demolition Inc. v. Damaris Developments Inc., 2012 ONSC 1912 (CanLII), released by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on March 26, 2012, serves as a good reminder to owners and contractors of the importance of ensuring a mutual understanding of the specifications and other requirements of the work and then properly incorporating those documents and requirements into the construction contract.  For litigation lawyers, it also serves as a good reminder of the importance of ensuring that adequate and flexible evidence of damages (whether Plaintiff’s damages or a Defendant’s claim for set-off) is obtained and brought to trial.

Basic Facts

In a nutshell, D’Urzo Demolition Inc. (“D’Urzo”) was the successful bidder to demolish structures on a property in Toronto and then mechanically reduce the rubble into smaller crush.  The owner, Damaris Developments Inc. (“Damaris”), took the position that the contract required D’Urzo to crush the concrete to ¾ inch and to also demolish curbs and asphalt and remove same from the site. D’Urzo took the position that it only had to reduce the rubble to size of 3 inches (and that a smaller crush would constitute an extra) and that demolishing the asphalt and curbs and removing same from the site was not included in the scope of work and, again, constituted an extra.  At the end of the day, D’Urzo was substantially successful at trial – Damaris succeeded only in achieving a finding that the asphalt and curbs had to be demolished – D’Urzo succeeded in convincing the Court that the contract only required a 3 inch crush, that the asphalt should not have been required to be removed from the site and disposed of, and that Damaris was in breach of the contract for failing to pay.

Take Away Notes

Of note for contractors and owners – the work was put out for tender, there were competitive bids, and the parties used a standard form (CCDC2) contract and they still ended up in protracted litigation (the lien was filed in May, 2007 and trial did not conclude until December, 2011 – almost 5 years!) arising from a failure to clearly and properly set out what work was required by the contract.  If you are going to go to the trouble of putting a job out for tender and then use a detailed and established form of contract, spend the time and money to make sure that the specifications and drawings that establish the scope of work are both clear and properly incorporated by the contract.

Of note for lawyers – Damaris claimed $50,400.00 as its back charge to remove and dispose of the asphalt and curbs and provided evidence that this was what it cost.  But Master Albert found at trial that D’Urzo only had to remove the asphalt, not dispose of it.  Because Damaris’ evidence didn’t breakdown the back charge between removal and disposal, Master Albert had only D’Urzo’s evidence that the cost to remove the asphalt was $2,643.75 and he awarded that amount. This outcome highlights the risk of evidence limited to global amounts that aren’t broken down into component parts in case of divided findings at trial.