Category Archives: Uncategorized

Ontario Government to seek intervenor status in Waterloo Region’s appeal of OMB ruling

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Kitchener-Waterloo’s main journalistic rag, The Record, reports that the Ontario Government will apply to the Court to become an intervenor (an intervenor is a party added to a court proceeding as a result of an interest in the outcome) in the Region of Waterloo’s appeal of the Ontario Municipal Board’s decision to open up more than 1,000 hectares of regional land to new greenfield development (compared to the 85 hectares set by the Region). As reported, if the Province’s motion is successful, the Region will have a powerful ally in its appeal.Suburban Sprawl

The significance of this appeal in shaping the development of the Region of Waterloo for future generations is obvious and many, myself included, will be watching with great interest as it unfolds.

Globe and Mail Interview: EllisDon CEO Geoff Smith: Building a different construction company

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Today’s online Globe and Mail posted a short but interesting article summarizing an interview of EllisDon’s President, Geoff Smith by the Globe & Mail’s Gordon Pitts.  Read the article here.

The most interesting observation Smith makes, from my perspective is, “General contractors are not builders – we are leaders and managers and it is all about information. We manage the process of other people doing the building. If you control that information and make the process efficient, you are ahead of the game.”  Not an earth-shattering revelation by any stretch but, for those of us for whom ”general contractor” still tends to invoke an image of a big guy smoking a cigarette out of his Ford F-350 caked in mud – Smith’s comment is enlightening.  Today’s general contractors are blurring the lines between “contractor” and “construction manager” and “project manager” and it is an industry becoming increasingly sophisticated. A good little read.

 

To arbitrate or litigate…that is the question

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In the last decade or so, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) – mediation and arbitration – has come a long way.  In fact, a good argument can be made that the “A” in ADR could probably be dropped. Gavel

Briefly, mediation is the process of seeking a negotiated resolution/settlement to a dispute using a neutral third party to facilitate the negotiation.  There is no “decision maker” in a classic mediation.  Mediation is a process that can take place outside of litigation entirely, be engaged in the context of litigation in an attempt at pre-trial settlement, or can even take place in the context of an arbitration proceeding (Med-Arb or otherwise).

Arbitration, by contrast, is much closer to the adversarial and adjudicative process that we associate with the courts.  Sometimes arbitration is mandated by legislation or a non-negotiated contract between that parties (that one party didn’t really have any say in).  In those cases, a party might be stuck with arbitration whether it/he/she wants to be or not.  Other times, however, parties will jointly agree to forego the courts in favour of arbitration.  There are, as far as I’m concerned, only really four essential reasons that parties might opt for arbitration over litigation.

  1. Privacy – unlike court proceedings, which are public in nature, arbitration is a private process where no decisions are published and the parties can keep the evidence and outcome private.
  2. Process – parties to an arbitration normally have the opportunity to agree upon procedures and rules that are different from the Rules of Civil Procedure and thereby shape and tailor the process to suit the needs of the dispute.
  3. Speed/Cost – because an arbitration has an adjudicator hired by the parties and they are not caught in the public system “waiting their turn”, there is at least the theoretical possibility of getting a result faster than if the parties were simply to litigate (for example, in Toronto it is not uncommon to have to wait five or six months to get a 15 minute hearing for a simple procedural motion).
  4. Appeals – the parties to an arbitration can limit the rights to appeal the decision of the arbitrator.

Zafir Holdings Inc. v. Grassmere Construction Ltd., 2013 ONSC 1835 is a very recent case out of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that demonstrates how the objectives of arbitration aren’t always satisfied in the manner that the parties may have hoped when they agreed – perhaps with flowers and butterflies floating about – to arbitrate.

Zafir Holdings was the owner and Grassmere Construction was its general contractor in relation to a large industrial construction project.  A dispute arose between Grassmere Construction and one of its subcontractors regarding some of the earthworks and that dispute percolated its way up to become a dispute between the Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings.  Grassmere Construction’s subcontractor got judgment at a trial against Grassmere Construction and Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings agreed to arbitrate the issues between them.  The arbitrator found that Zafir Holdings owed Grassmere Construction a large portion of the amount that Grassmere Construction had to pay its subcontractor (as well as other amounts in relation to other issues).  Zafir Holdings sought, and was granted, the Court’s permission (leave) to appeal the arbitrator’s decision.

In the context of this short article, this case is notable insofar as it demonstrates how the primary objectives of arbitration were probably almost entirely obliterated in the end result. Consider:

  1. Privacy – the appeal, and the very fact that I was able to read the Court’s Decision and write about it here, means that if the parties had privacy as one of their objectives (whether unilateral or mutual), that benefit of arbitration has been lost.
  2. Process – there’s no way to tell whether the parties achieved any benefit here but, insofar as the ability to modify process usually has cost as its objective, I generally doubt it.
  3. Speed/Cost – the dispute arose in 2004 or 2005 and Grassmere Construction’s subcontractor obtained its judgment in June 2010.  By contrast, Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings didn’t get their decision in the arbitration until November, 2012 – two and a half years later!  Given that both Grassmere Construction and Zafir Holdings were likely involved in the litigation with the subcontractor (at least to some extent) and then had to adjudicate their dispute before the arbitrator (and pay the arbitrator’s fee which was likely substantial), it’s hard to imagine how there might have been significant cost-savings in the way that it all unfolded.
  4. Appeals – Zafir Holdings has been granted leave to appeal so there was no benefit here (in fact, the motion to seek leave to appeal added a layer of cost that wouldn’t have existed if the underlying arbitration decision had been a judgment of the court).

I’m not anti-arbitration – it certainly has the potential to be a useful alternative to litigation in certain types of cases.  However, cases such as Zafir Holdings Inc. v. Grassmere Construction Ltd. highlight the reason that I believe most parties contemplating putting a mandatory arbitration provision into an agreement, or those facing a decision whether to arbitrate rather than litigate in the face of a dispute, should very carefully and deliberately consider the potential benefits of arbitration.  In such circumstances, the question should be asked: “Is there a really compelling reason that I/we should take on the cost of an arbitrator (in addition to the cost of my/our lawyers) rather than proceed in a public forum and let my/our tax dollars pay for the judge?” More often than not, in my view, the answer will be “No”.

Mike Holmes weighs in on Title Insurance

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Construction deficiency claims and title insurance being two of my primary areas of practice and both being near and dear to my heart, I read Mike Holmes’ article “A flood of misinformation: Title insurance is not a home warranty” in the National Post with some interest.

I don’t agree with everything that Holmes says in the article but he got the title right anyway.  Title insurance is a specialized insurance product and, as a very general statement, protects purchasers of real property from a long list of “title” or “ownership” related problems or “risks”.  It is not, and doesn’t pretend to be, a warranty of good design and/or construction.  The title of the article seems to suggest that Holmes agrees with this proposition. So far, so good.

Where Holmes really loses me, though, is when, in discussing hypothetical homeowners who discover major construction deficiencies, he writes, “Who’s at fault? Is it the homeowner who got the renovation? Is it the contractor that was hired? Is it the title insurance company, the building inspector or the government? As far as I’m concerned, it’s all of the above.”  How can the title insurer be at fault?

A policy of insurance (be it title insurance or some other kind of insurance coverage) covers what it covers and doesn’t cover what it doesn’t cover.  For Holmes to suggest, as he does, that the title insurer is at fault in the scenario he outlined is a bit like saying that when your house gets broken into and your auto insurer won’t pay for your stolen sofa, your auto insurer is partly at fault for your loss.

In any case – I thought the article was worth mentioning as Homes has brought some good media exposure to title insurance and cast at least a little bit of light on a common misunderstanding that I see all too often in my practice.

An “Interest”ing Decision – A contractual interest claim gone wrong

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What an awful Blog post title. My apologies.

The Decision of Madame Justice Pierce in 1188710 Ontario Ltd. v. Gartner, 2012 ONSC 6110 (CanLII) is a good reminder of how judges trying to do perceived justice between parties sometimes finds the law bent (or worse – disregarded) in favour of perceived justice.

The facts of the case aren’t particularly remarkable – contractor does work, owner takes issue with various things and doesn’t pay all invoices, contractor liens, lawsuit follows.  Same old story.  Sometimes the contractor comes out on top and sometimes it is the owner that prevails.  In this case, Pierce J. interpreted the agreement between the contractor and the owners and the evidence that was presented at trial almost entirely in favour the contractor.

The two aspects of the Decision that prompted me to write this short post are:

  1. Pierce J. found a contractual entitlement to interest and awarded the contractor interest at 5.5% per annum; and
  2. Pierce J. declared that the contractor has a lien against the Defendants’ property for an amount that includes the interest that she found to be owing.

Contractual Interest

If Pierce J. had just addressed the issue of interest as one of damages (the contractor’s losses based on interest the contractor had to pay on its line of credit or to its own suppliers) rather than as interest and if the contractor had presented better evidence on this point, I don’t think there would be an issue.  However, because Pierce J. expressly found that there was no agreement as to interest (see paras 37 & 40), I think she should have been foreclosed from awarding contractual interest.  Nonetheless, she (wrongly in my view) reasoned that a contractual obligation to pay invoices within a specified time implied an agreement to pay interest if payment was not made within that time (see para 44).  If Pierce J. were right on this, it would effectively mean that every contract that obliges a party to pay contains an implied agreement to pay interest if payment isn’t made.  I don’t think that this is the law and I don’t think this accords with longstanding jurisprudence that parties should, as a general rule, be held to their bargains – if the contractor had wanted to negotiate a contractual entitlement and rate of interest, he could easily have done so.

The next part is that there seemed to be some very loose (it seems to have been given just in oral testimony at trial) evidence that the contractor had suffered some sort of losses based on having to dip into his line of credit and charges from his own suppliers as a result of the owner not paying all of his invoices (see para 100, for example).  It was this evidence that Pierce J. used to determine the rate of “interest” that the contractor should be entitled to (5.5% was the contractor’s rate on his line of credit…so Pierce J. somehow made that the contractual rate of interest “agreed to” between the contractor and the owner).  I wouldn’t be so offended by this had Pierce J. just characterised the amount payable as damages rather than interest.  However, even then, the problem would be that she found as a fact that, “Unfortunately, there is no evidence about how much [the contractor] had to draw on his line of credit for this project, or how much interest he paid.”  In effect, she awarded damages in the absence of any evidence of the proven quantum of those damages.

I think that there should have been found to be no agreement as to interest and so only pre-judgment interest payable to the contractor pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.  Further, should Pierce J. have been inclined to find a breach of an obligation to pay on the part of the owner, she could have still found damages to have resulted from the breach but she should have then found (on the evidence described by the Decision) that the contractor did not adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim and then awarded no damages on the basis that quantum had not been proven.  Instead we are left with, in my view, a bad Decision (on this point) that could come back to haunt other litigants arguing this sort of contractual interest dispute.

Lien for Interest

On the second point, section 14(2) of the Construction Lien Act expressly says that, “No person is entitled to a lien for any interest on the amount owed to the person in respect of the services or materials that have been supplied by the person, but nothing in this subsection affects any right that the person may otherwise have to recover that interest.”  As such, Pierce J. erred in law by including the interest she awarded the contractor in the declared amount of the lien she declared the contractor to have over the owner’s lands.  The interest should have been included in the money judgment but should not have been included in the value of the lien.

Suppliers and contractors beware! – Owner’s own defective specification triggers supplier’s warranty obligation

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Hypothetical contractual provision and scenario:

“The contractor shall supply and install 8” widgits as required by the owner.  The contractor warrants that the 8” widgits will be fit for their intended purpose and that the 8” widgits will be free from all defects arising at any time from faulty design in any part of the 8” widgits.”

After the 8” widgits are supplied and installed, it turns out that 8” widgits are too long to serve their purpose and 6” widgits should have been used.  The 8” widgits have to be replaced with 6” widgits at a cost of $3,000,000.

On these limited facts, do you think a court would make the contractor or the owner bear the cost of replacing the 8” widgits with 6” widgits?

The recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Greater Vancouver Water District v. North American Pipe & Steel Ltd. serves as a serious warning to suppliers and supply contractor about the risks that can attach to an unqualified warranty against design defects, even when the manufactured product is supplied in compliance with the owner’s (or some other third party’s) specifications.

The case arose from a contract for the supply of water pipe to the Greater Vancouver Regional District (the owner).  The owner’s specification required that the pipe have a seal coat over a fibre mat over-wrap.  The contract between the owner and the pipe supplier included provisions that the supplier:

  • “…warrants … that the Goods … will conform to all applicable Specifications … and, unless otherwise specified, will be fit for the purpose for which they are to be used. …” and
  • “…warrants and guarantees that the Goods are free from all defects arising at any time from faulty design in any part of the Goods.”

The pipe was manufactured according to the owner’s specifications.  However, following the supply of the pipe, the seal coat on the pipe began delaminating.  The owner sued under the warranty for the repair costs for the defective pipe.  The pipe supplier defended itself, arguing that its warranty should be restricted to its own design or manufacture errors (not defects arising from the owner’s own specifications).

The trial judge agreed with the pipe supplier and found the above provisions to be inconsistent with one another.  She reconciled the inconsistency by resort to the rules of contractual interpretation and determined that the parties did not intend that the supplier’s guarantee and warranty (the second provision above) would extend to cover defects arising from the owner’s own specifications.  On the basis of the expert evidence presented, the trial judge found that the defect in the pipe was caused by the owner’s specifications (i.e. not some other manufacturing defect) and dismissed the owner’s claims in respect of the defective pipe.  The owner appealed.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and found that the contract was clear and the warranty applied regardless of whose design gave rise to the defects. The Court of Appeal found an old Supreme Court of Canada case to be applicable and determinative of the appeal.  The Court of Appeal reversed the Judgment of the Court below and found in the owner’s favour.

It’s an interesting Decision but the nub of the caution to be taken from it is found in Justice Chiasson’s closing remarks:

[Warranty clauses such as the one here] distribute risk. Sometimes they appear to do so unfairly but that is a matter for the marketplace, not for the courts. There is a danger attached to such clauses. Contractors may refuse to bid or, if they do so, may build in costly contingencies. Those who do not protect themselves from unknown potential risk may pay dearly. Owners are unlikely to benefit from circumstances where suppliers and contractors are faced with the prospect of potentially disastrous consequences. Parties to construction or supply contracts may find it in their best interest to address more practically the assumption of design risk. To fail to do so merely creates the potential for protracted and costly litigation.

This is another example of the courts deciding a contractual dispute between two parties on the basis of, “a deal is a deal even if it’s not a very fair deal” rather than on the basis of what many might consider to be the more “fair” or the “correct” outcome.

If you are a supplier or supply contractor (or even a trade or general contractor for that matter), this case gives good cause for you to pay very close attention to the warranty requirements when responding to a tender call or reviewing an owner’s proposed form of contract.  If the proposed contract requires you to manufacture or install in accordance with someone else’s specifications/instructions and the warranty/guarantee provisions then make you responsible for any defects, you might very well be responsible for the owner’s (or other third party’s) own defective specification.  Coming full circle to my opening scenario – if you are that contractor, you better be sure that the 8” widget is manufactured and installed properly and that the 8” widget is the right size or you might be $3,000,000 lighter in the pocket!

Elliot Lake mall collapse litigation is underway

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The Globe and Mail reports today that lawsuits are underway. Click here to read the article.  There probably won’t be much of interest to report for quite some time (as the case moves slowly through discovery and pre-trial procedural motions) but I will keep an eye on the case and post anything of interest.

Notice (Still) Means Notice: Ontario Court of Appeal upholds dismissal of contractor’s claim for failure to provide notice of the claim to the owner as required by the contract

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Hot off the presses is Technicore Underground Inc. v. Toronto (City) in which the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld the lower Court’s decision to dismiss a contractor’s (Clearway) claim against the owner (City of Toronto) as a result of Clearway’s failure to give the City of Toronto notice of its claim within 30 days “…after completion of the work affected by the situation” as was required by the contract between the parties.

Clearway gave the City of Toronto notice for part of its claim within the 30 day period required by the contract but didn’t give notice of another, much larger, component of its desired claim until more than three years later and within the context of the litigation that was commenced following the initial notice was given.  The City of Toronto brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the portion of Clearway’s claim for which notice had not been given within the required 30 days.  The motions judge granted partial summary judgment and dismissed the bulk of Clearway’s claim (more than $2.1M) for failure to give notice as required by the contract.

On appeal, Clearway argued that:

  • the notice provision was merely procedural and required “failing which” (or my preferred, “or else…”) language to have the drastic effect of permitting the dismissal of the claim;
  • in the absence of prejudice to the City of Toronto arising from the failure to give notice, the failure to give notice should not be fatal;
  • the City of Toronto’s own failure to comply with a different provision of the contract should disentitle it from relying on the notice provision;
  • portions of the claims for which no/late notice was given were really just extensions of the parts of the claim for which notice was given; and
  • the City of Toronto waived its right to rely on the notice provision.

The Court of Appeal rejected all of Clearway’s arguments and dismissed the appeal.  In so doing, the Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in Corpex (1977) Inc. v. The Queen in right of Canada (and the BC and Ontario Decisions in Doyle Construction Co. v. Carling O’Keefe Breweries of Canada Ltd. and Bemar Construction (Ontario) Inc. v. Mississauga (City of)).  I’m not going to repeat or summarize the Court’s reasoning but, if you are so inclined, it is worth the 15-20 minute read.

For contractors and owners, the primary take-away from this Decision is the reminder of how critical it is to know what is in your contract, understand what is required in various situations, and if the contract requires that you do something – to do it!  The consequences of failing to follow the requirements of your contract are not always this dramatic (and sometimes there will be some fact or event that can relieve you from a failure to comply) but why take the chance?

For fellow lawyers, aside from the substantive utility and importance of this Decision, I think we can all take note of the increasingly obvious reality that one of the most effective, appropriate, and useful applications of the new Rule 20 regime for summary judgment motions is the early and inexpensive resolution of claims that can be determined on the basis of the interpretation of contractual provisions (and their application to uncontroversial facts).